In a soft model-theoretical context, we investigate the properties of logics satisfying the Robinson consistency theorem; the latter is for many purposes the same as the Craig interpolation theorem together with compactness. Applications are given to H. Friedman's third and fourth problem.
Robinson consistency theorem implies countable compactness and the Craig interpolation theorem is any countably generated logic. Notice that this result was obtained by Makowsky and Shelah via an additional "Feferman Vaught" assumption.
In §4 we take up extensions of L(QX) in the light of [Mul] ; then Theorem 3.1 immediately yields that if L > L(QX) satisfies the Robinson consistency theorem, then L can characterize all structures up to cardinal ua (by means of their complete theories in L), and L is a very large logic which is neither axiomatizable nor countably compact. Under (something weaker than) CH we also prove in Corollaries 4.2 and 4.3 that any such L necessarily has uncountably many quantifiers and that the real numbers can be characterized by a theory in L.
In §5 (under -i0* or -iL*1) we prove that if Sicl(t) is a set for t a set, then L satisfies the Robinson consistency theorem iff L is compact and satisfies the Craig interpolation theorem. In [Mu3] this was proved under -i0*. The proof is almost the same if one uses -iL*4, see [Mu4] , or even if one assumes that V« regular > w, for any uniform ultrafilter D on k, Va > w, D is À-descendingly incomplete. From the main theorem in [MSI] , the same identity can be established by assuming that there is no measurable cardinal > u>, and that L has an "occurrence number".
In §6 we prove some results about H. Friedman's third and fourth problem in [Fr] ; namely, in Theorem 6.1, under -i0* or -i LM, we show that no logic L between Lxa and Lxx satisfies the Craig interpolation (or the Robinson consistency) theorem, unless =¿ = = . In Theorems 6.2 and 6.3 we prove two results whose effect is practically that any logic L satisfying the Robinson consistency theorem together with some kind of Löwenheim requirement will automatically have =l equal to = on the class of countable structures of finite type.
In conclusion, we do agree with the observation by Makowsky and Shelah in [MS] , that with more effort more theorems about (the interpolation and definability properties in) abstract model theory should be provable.
Still, we wonder why theorems in soft model theory may be so hard.
0. Preliminaries. Ordinals and, in particular, cardinals, are denoted by small Greek letters; the first infinite cardinals are written us = w0, <o,, . . ., ww, .... We shall be working throughout with logics L as defined in [Fl] and/or in [Fe2] . Unexplained notation is standard; for t a (similarity) type, Str(r) is the class of all structures of type t, StcL(r) is the class of all sentences in logic L of type t (following [Fel] and [Fe2] ); notice that what we call a type is called a language by many authors. For T Ç Sicl(t) a theory in L of type t, mod¿ T is the class of models of T; for 21 G Str(r), thL 21 is the complete theory of 21 in L of type t.
Following [MSS] , we let 72t = (93|93 sb 21}; given 21, 93 G Str(r) and logic L, 2Í =l 33 means that thL 2Í = thL 93. Notice that t may be infinite, and StcL(T) may be a proper class. 0.1 Definition. Given logic L and structure 21 G Str(r) we say that in L, 2Í is characterizable by its theory in type r iff mod£ th£ 21 = /2Í; that is to say that any model 93 of the complete theory of 21 in type t is isomorphic to 2Í; when there is no ambiguity we drop mention of L. For X an ordinal, the characterizability of X (or, equivalently, of (X, < » by its theory in type {<}, with < a binary relation symbol, means of course that modL thL<Â, < > = I(X, < > = I(X, e|x>. An important feature of logics L is their closure under relativization of formulas to formulas; for the case L = L^J^Q')^,, [MSS, p. 159 ] note that relativization is built in the formation rules for formulas. We shall have to relativize a sentence \¡/ to formula <p (x, v,, . . . ,yr) with y,, . . . ,yr acting as parameters; we shall then write jj{x\<p(.xji.yr)} Notice that [MS] write instead ^x'y<.»>.
If 2t G Str(r) and A ' is contained in the universe A of 21 and is nonvoid on each sort of t, then 2t|^' denotes the substructure of 21 generated by A'. 0.2 Definition. Logic L has the Robinson property (or, equivalently, in L the Robinson consistency theorem holds) iff for any theories T, 7\ and T2 and types t, t, and t2 with t = t, n t2, if 7", and T2 are consistent extensions of T respectively in type t, and t2, and T is complete in r, then 71, u T2 is consistent in t, u t2.
For the definition of other interpolation and definability properties, see [MSS] and [MS] .
We recall that logic L is (<o, co)-compact (or, equivalently, countably compact) iff each inconsistent countable theory in L has some inconsistent finite subtheory.
1. From ordinals to arbitrary structures.
Proposition.
Let logic L have the Robinson property; assume that L is not (<o, u)-compact; then <w, < > is characterizable in L by its theory T0 = thL<w, < ) in type {E} with E a binary relation symbol.
Proof. Since L is not countably compact then for some type t' D { E} and some (countable) consistent theory T' of type t' we have V2Í G Str(r'), 21' 1= V implies 2Í' \ {E} s <w, <> (see [MS, 1.3 ] who refer to [Ba] and [Fl] , or see the proof of Theorem 2.1 in this paper). Assume now that T0 has some model 93 ?* <<o, < > (absurdum hypothesis). Structure 93 is still a discrete linear ordering with an initial element, and has some expansion 93' = <93, P,f,b} (P unary relation,/ unary function, b a constant, all symbols not already in t') satisfying the sentence i^ (of Laa) which says that "E is a discrete linear ordering with an initial element and /maps the set P of predecessors of b one-one onto P u {&}". Now 7"0 u {>/'} is a consistent extension of T0 and T0 u {</'} U T' is inconsistent, by the above properties of theory 7". This contradicts the assumed Robinson property of L. Q.E.D.
1.2 Theorem. Let L have the Robinson property and n G <o; assume that each ordinal X < (0" is characterizable in L by its theory 7\ of type {E}, with E a binary relation symbol. Then for any single-sorted structure 21 such that |2t| < wn, we have that modL thL2I = 721.
Remark. The single-sortedness assumption is only for simplicity. For the proof we prepare 1.3 Lemma. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1.2, we have that for any cardinal K < co", K is characterizable in L by its theory T* in the pure identity language (viz., in the single-sorted type having no symbols; notice that equality is available in any case).
Proof. Assume (absurdum hypothesis) that some model M of TK with \M\ = ft is such that ¡i ¥= k; then we proceed by cases.
Case one. fi > k. Add ¡i many new constants a0, a,, . . . , and extend T" to theory T' obtained by adding axioms aa =£ aß (whenever a ¥= ß). Let TK denote th¿<K, < > of type {E}, where <k, < ) is the least ordinal of cardinality k. By our hypothesis about TK, T' u TK is inconsistent, which contradicts the assumed Robinson property.
Case two. p < k. Expand n toa well order < ft, < ) and let 7M be its theory in type {E}. By assumption, all the models of 7M are isomorphic, hence, in particular, their cardinality is /x. Let T'K be the theory in type {E'} of the least ordinal <k, < > of cardinality k, with E' a new binary relation symbol. By assumption, all the models of T'K have cardinality k, therefore 7" u jT U T'K is inconsistent, which contradicts the assumed Robinson property of L. Proof. Let 93 =¿ 21; then, by the reduct property of logic L we have that Í8 \ {<} =l ^i I {<}■ By definition of 21 and by the assumed characterizability of X, we thus have that 93t{<}s2if{<}=£<X, <>. Therefore, by the isomorphism property of logic L, we can safely assume that 93 f1 { < } = 21 f { < } Now if 93 ^ 2Í (absurdum hypothesis) there is some symbol S G t (to fix ideas, let S be a unary relation symbol) and there is some ordinal ¡i <X such that 21 N S\ n] but 931= -i S\ ¡i] (or vice versa).
(In the general case, for S having many places, one shall work with a finite sequence of ordinals smaller than X.) Let 7" be thL<21, /x> in type t u {m'}-Let T" be thL<93, ft> in type r U {m"} (with m! and m" new constant symbols). Let 7( resp. 7^) characterize <\, < > (resp. < ¡l, < » in type { < } (here, and only here, we are using symbol < instead of E to gain intuition). Let 7^ (resp. 7"') say that the order type of the set of predecessors of m' (resp. of m") is /i. 7^ is obtained by relativizing each sentence of 7^ to {x\x < m'}, i.e. to formula x < m'; similarly, T¡¡ is the relativization of 7^ to formula x < m". Notice that 7' D 7; u Tx and 7" D 7; u Tx.
We now claim that 7' u 7" is inconsistent; as a matter of fact, if 9? t= 7' u 7"
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On the other hand, the assumed properties of 7', T", Tx ensure that 9Î f m! = w", thus 9Î 1= w' = m" A Sm' A -1 Sm" which is impossible.
The lemma is now proved by noting that the inconsistency of 7" U 7" contradicts the assumed Robinson property.
1.5 Proof of Theorem 1.2. Let 93 =¿ 21 be single-sorted structures of type t0; let |2I| = X < «". By characterizability of |2t| (Lemma 1.3) and by reduct we have |93| = A. Expand 91 to 91' = <2t, £> in type t, and 93 to 93' = <93, F} (E ¥= F new binary relation symbols) in type t2, in such a way that (A, E) a (B, F>-« <X, <> < <<o", <>.
Both thL 21' and thL 93' are consistent extensions of th¿ 21, resp., in type t( and t2 with T, n t2 = t0. Hence, by the Robinson property there exists 2ft G Str(r, u tŝ uch that 2Í' =L 2ft [ t, and 93' =L 3ft \ t2. 2. Jumping to»" + l.
2.1 Theorem. Assume that logic L has the Robinson property and is not countably compact. Let n G u and assume that each ordinal X < <on+1 can be characterized by its theory Tx in type {E} (E a binary relation symbol). Then wn + 1 itself can be characterized by its theory in type {E}.
Proof. By [MS, 6.6(iii) ], the fact that L is not (co, w)-compact implies that L is not con+1-relatively compact, i.e. there are theories 2 = {<pja < w" + 1} and T such that 2 u T is inconsistent, but for any subset 20 Q 2 with |20| < wn+1, 20 u r is consistent. Let t be the type of 2 u T. For any ordinal ß < con+1 define 2/3 = {<Pala < ß) an(i let 3Í/9 De a model of 2^ u I\ It is no loss of generality to assume that the universes of the 21^ are pairwise disjoint and that t has only relation symbols. Now expand t to t' by adding a new sort a and new symbols/, E, F, aK (for all ordinals k < w" + 1) where E and F are binary relations (to be interpreted) over the new sort, the aKys are constants over a, and / is a unary function taking elements of the old sorts of t into elements of a. Define 2ft G Str(T') as follows (here, for simplicity, symbols are identified with their interpreta- FXfi holds in 2ft iff X, ji < un+, and 21x f «p^.
Roughly, 2ft is a disjoint union of the 21^ together with a "satisfaction" predicate F relating 21^ to the sentences of 2. Structure 2ft satisfies theory 7 of type t' given by the following sentences (here we use the small Greek letters f, tj, 6, for variables on the new sort a).
(Axl)K<x<u . E is a linear ordering of the elements of the new sort a and EaKax. (Ax2)K<(_ . The order type of the set of predecessors of aK is <k, < > (one has just to relativize to {x\ExaK} theory TK which is assumed by hypothesis, to characterize <k, < >).
(Ax3)iEsorts of T. Vf 3xs f(xs) = f (i.e. whenever f is of sort a its inverse image under/ is nonnull on each sort of type t).
(Ax4)/3<w . Vtj (Fi)aß -» <r^Jc|-/w"7')) (i.e. in the Tith universe <pß is satisfied if Ftjí^). (Ax5). Vf Vtj /fiyf -* Ffrj (so that, by (Ax4) theory 2f is satisfied in the fth universe). (Ax6)rer. Vf yÍ*W»>-í) (so that r is satisfied in the fth universe). Claim 1. V9? f 7 there is no m G N (N the universe of 9Î) such that 9? 1= EaK [m] for all k < w"+1. As a matter of fact, assume such 9Î and m exist (absurdum hypothesis). Let 9?' = <9Î, w>; then in 9Î' the following hold: /~'(m) ^= 0 on each sort of r (by (Ax3)), r holds when relativized to/-'(m) (by (Ax6)), Claim 2. V9? f 7, 9? f {7Í} = <<o"+" < >. As a matter of fact, since |9? f {F}\ > wn+i by (Axl), it suffices to show that 9Î is well ordered and each m G N has at most un many predecessors. Assume 9? f 7 and 9Î is not well ordered (absurdum hypothesis). Then Tí is a linear ordering having some infinitely descending chain c0 > c, > • • • , but c0 cannot bound the aK by Claim 1, so by letting ax (for some A < w"+i) be greater than c0 we have that the set of predecessors of ax is not well ordered, thus contradicting (Ax2), in view of the characterizability of (X, < > by Similarly, if 9? has some element m G N with fi many predecessors, ju a cardinal > w", then by Claim 1 there exists X < w" + 1 such that ax is greater than m; hence ax cannot satisfy (Ax2), a contradiction. This proves Claim 2.
Claim 3. (End of the proof of Theorem 2.1.) Let 70 = thL<con+1, < > in type {E} (£ a binary relation symbol). Then v»i=r»»«<«t+1, <>.
As a matter of fact, assume 9? t= 70 with 9? 9* <wn + 1, < > (absurdum hypothesis). Then (i) either 9Î is not well ordered, (ii) or some mGJV has more than un predecessors, (iii) or, finally, |9?| < M|1+1. (i) If 9Î is not well ordered then there is some infinitely descending chain c0 > c, > • • • , so there is an expansion 9Î' = (31, cr}r£a satisfying theory 7" defined by 7 ' = 70 u [Ecr+lcr\(r G u) }. On the other hand, by Claim 2, the 7i-reduct of any model of 7 is well ordered, so that 7' u T u 70 is inconsistent; but this contradicts the assumed Robinson property of L (notice that T0 is complete in {E} = type(7') n type(r)).
(ii) If m G N has more than un many predecessors, say {cK}K<a , consider the expansion 31' = (31, m, cK>K<^+i and let 7" be the complete theory of 9Î' in type t" = {E, m, cm}K< . By arguing as in (i) above we see that 7" u 7 u 70 is inconsistent; but this contradicts the assumed Robinson property.
(iii) Assume finally |9?| = com < w" + 1. Expand 9Î to 31' = <9Î, £'> (£" a new binary relation symbol) by stipulating that 31' [ {E'} as <wm, < >. Since by assumption <wm, < > can be characterized by its complete theory T in type {£"}, we have that all the models of theory T0 u 7^ have cardinality equal to u>m. Hence 70 u 7* U Ta is inconsistent, again contradicting the assumed Robinson property.
This proves Theorem 2.1. Q.E.D.
3. Categoricity and compactness.
3.1 Theorem. Let logic L have the Robinson property. Assume that L is not (w, u) )-compact. Then for any single-sorted structure 21 with |2I| < wu we have modL thL 21 = 721.
Proof. Let |2t| = «"; the proof is by induction on n. The case n = 0. By Proposition 1.1 <w, < > is characterizable by its complete theory; then by Theorem 1.2 each single-sorted countable structure is characterizable by its theory.
The case n + 1. By the induction hypothesis Theorem 3.1 holds for n, i.e. each single-sorted structure of cardinality < w" is characterizable. In particular, each ordinal X < un+l is characterizable. By Theorem 2.1 un + l itself is characterizable, hence each ordinal fi < w" + 1 is characterizable. Then, again by Theorem 1.2, each single-sorted structure 21 with |2t| < w"+1 is characterizable.
Q.E.D. 3.2 Remarks, (i) The single-sortedness hypothesis is just for simplicity. (ii) Theorem 3.1 roughly states that any logic having the Robinson property is either countably compact or has a very strong expressive power (in fact the strongest possible up to cardinal wu).
(iii) A number of consequences can be drawn from Theorem 3.1 by either limiting the size of L or by making purely set-theoretical assumptions.
The following corollary links the Robinson consistency with the Craig interpolation theorem; it improves [MS, 6.11] where the same result is obtained with the help of an additional " Feferman-Vaught" hypothesis. For the definition of 3.3 Corollary. Assume that 2" < 2"" for some n G w. Let L = L(M(Q')ÍElu have the Robinson property; then in L the Craig interpolation theorem holds and L is (w, (S)-compact.
Proof. We first claim that L is (w, w)-compact. If not, then Vn G « and Vj Ç <o" the complete theory of <w", < , s} in type {E, S) (E binary, S unary relation symbols) can characterize <w", < , s} up to isomorphism, by Theorem 3.1. Thus number of theories of L of type {E, S } > number of isomorphism classes 7<w", < , s} for s Ç u", i.e. 2"". Now notice that in any countably generated logic, such as L, the number of theories of finite type cannot exceed 2". Thus 2" > 2"" Vn G <o contradicting our set-theoretical assumption.
Therefore L is (co, w)-compact; but the Robinson property and countable compactness for a countably generated logic are well known to imply the Craig interpolation theorem (see [MS, 2.1] ). Q.E.D. 4. The case L > L(QX). Let L(QX) be the logic with quantifier "there exist uncountably many". 4.1 Theorem. If L > L(QX) satisfies the Robinson consistency theorem, then (i) L is not axiomatizable, nor countably compact, (ii) V2Í with 21 single-sorted and |2I| < wu, we have modL thL 21 = 72Í, (iii) if E is a binary relation symbol and S is unary, then 2\stcL{E,s}\ > y** for any n e w.
Proof, (i) has been proved in [Mul] . (ii) follows immediately from (i) in the light of Theorem 3.1. (iii) Since L is not countably compact by (i), then we can argue as in the proof of Corollary 3.3 to conclude that number of theories of L of type { E, S } = 2|StCi<*-s Jl > 2"-for all n G w.
Corollary.
Assume that 2U < 2U" for some n G w; then no countably generated (i.e. having countably many quantifiers) extension L of L(QX) satisfies the Robinson consistency theorem.
Proof. Assume that L is a counterexample; then by Theorem 4.1(iii) we have that 2" > 2"-Vn G w, since |StcL{7i, S}\ = w in any countably generated logic L.
This contradicts our set-theoretical assumption.
Something weaker than CH also yields 4.3 Corollary. Assume that a>" = 2" for some n G w; then if L > L(QX) satisfies the Robinson consistency theorem, the system of real numbers is characterizable by its complete theory in L.
Proof. Then there are «"-many reals; now apply Theorem 4.1(h).
5. An identity. Let -i L* abbreviate the following set-theoretical statement:
"there is no inner model with a measurable cardinal > <o". Recall that compactness means (k, w)-compactness for all k > o¡. 5.1 Theorem (Assuming -iO*, or even -iL*1). In logic L, let Sicl(t) be a set whenever t is a set; then L satisfies the Robinson consistency theorem iff L is compact and satisfies the Craig interpolation theorem.
Proof. In [Mu3] the theorem is proved under -iO*; but Claim 2 thereof (which is the only point where -i 0s is used) is actually a consequence of [MS, 6.6(iv) ] only. The latter, in turn, only depends on [MS, 6.4(h) ] and on the fact that for any infinite regular cardinal k, for any uniform ultrafilter D on k, D is X-descendingly incomplete for all infinite X. Now this final statement is well known to be weaker than -, L"; see [MS, 6.5(iii) ] or [DJK] . 5.2 Remark. For logics L in which StcL(r) is a set if so is t, -i Lm also yields that "compactness = JEP", the latter being the Joint Embedding Property for L-elementary embeddings. Use the argument found in [Mu4] where one also can find a complete proof of Theorem 5.1. The same identities have been independently proved in [MSI] by assuming that there is no measurable cardinal > w and that L has an "occurrence number". 6. H. Friedman's problems. H. Friedman's third problem in [Fr] of finding logics strictly between L^ and Lxx¡ satisfying the Craig interpolation theorem is still unsolved; but (a refinement of) the lemmas in § §1 and 2 of this paper (see [Mu5]) yield the following. 6.1 Theorem (Assuming -iO* or -iL*1). No logic L between Lxu and Lxa0 satisfies the Craig interpolation theorem, nor the Robinson consistency theorem, unless Proof. In [Mu5, Theorems 5.5 and 5.7 ] the theorem is proved under assumption -iO8; but -iO* is only needed for the proof of Theorem 5.4 therein. The latter theorem, however, still holds under assumption -iL*\ by the observation made in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Also H. Friedman's fourth problem, asking for proper extensions of first order logic which satisfy compactness and interpolation, is still unsolved. Notice that one might equivalently ask for extensions satisfying compactness and the Robinson consistency theorem, or even, in the light of Theorem 5.1 (under some suitable hypotheses), ask for extensions satisfying the Robinson consistency theorem alone. 6.2 Theorem. Let L be a countably-generated logic satisfying the Robinson consistency theorem. Assume that every consistent theory T with |7| < to has a model of cardinality < w. Then L -Laù!.
Proof.
L must be countably compact, for otherwise, by Theorem 3.1, th¿<w,, < ) would be a consistent countable theory of type {<} having no countable model, thus contradicting our (Löwenheim) assumption. Besides countable compactness, L also has its Löwenheim number (for sentences) equal to w. Now apply the Lindstrom theorem (see [Li] or [Fl] ). Q.E.D.
To prove Theorem 6.3 we need to relativize the Robinson property to a class of structures. More precisely, let X be a class of structures; then, following [Mu2] , we say that logic L satisfies the Robinson consistency theorem on X iff V2ft G X n Str(r'), VSR G X n Str(r"), if t = t' n t" and 2ft \ r =L 31 \ t, then 321 G X n Str(r' u t") with 21 \ r' =L 2ft and 21 \ r" =L 31.
This definition is a natural generalization of Definition 0.2; when X is the class of all structures then clearly L satisfies the Robinson consistency theorem on X iff L satisfies the Robinson consistency theorem in the sense of Definition 0.2. Let K be the class of all countable structures of finite type, and Y be the class of all structures; we can prove the following result.
6.3 Theorem (-,0* or -iL*1). Let L = 7uu(ß'),e/ (with ¡ a set) satisfy the Robinson consistency theorem on Y as well as on K. Then 21 =¿ 93 iff 21 = 93, for any two countable structures 21 and 93.
Proof. By the main theorem in [Mu2] , =¿ on K is either equal to = or to = . By Theorem 5.1, L is compact; thus it suffices to prove our theorem only for 21 and 93 having finite type, since each sentence of L will only depend on a finite number of symbols. Assume =l = = (absurdum hypothesis). Let T be any first order theory which is consistent and complete in the finite type t, having one sort s, and which is w,-categorical but not to-categorical; then 7 has exactly to many nonisomorphic countable models (Baldwin and Lachlan, [BL] ), 9?0, 9Ï,, . . . , 3ln, . . . , (n G w). On the other hand, Vn G w, thL 3l" is to-categorical by the absurdum hypothesis, and has models of arbitrarily large cardinality, by compactness. Let C" be the class of cardinals k such that thL 31 " has a model of cardinality k; then CnC\ Cm = {u} by the Morley theorem applied to 7. Let p: t -> tp be a namechanger with t n tp = {s}; p naturally transforms 3l0 into 9îg G Str(rp); then, thL 9îg u thL 9?, has only countable models, as C0 is disjoint from C,\{to}, which contradicts the fact that L is compact.
Q.E.D.
